The strategy builds on the \u201c2D Strategy\u201d (comprising \u201cdefense and dialogue\u201d),\u00a0proposed<\/a> by KMT Chairman Eric Chu\u00a0(\u6731\u7acb\u502b Zh\u016b L\u00ecl\u00fan)<\/span>\u00a0and later promoted\u00a0by the KMT\u2019s former chairman Johnny Chiang (\u6c5f\u5553\u81e3 Ji\u0101ng Q\u01d0ch\u00e9n), who accompanied Hou during the visit.<\/p>\n Hours before Hou’s address at Brookings, Foreign Affairs magazine published an article<\/a> by Hou titled “Taiwan\u2019s path between extremes,” in which he described details of his policy positions on pivotal issues, including U.S.-Taiwan relations, cross-strait relations, and national defense. The publication\u2019s timing underscored the KMT’s careful planning of the visit.<\/p>\n Such meticulous preparation appears to have yielded positive results. U.S. scholars who interacted with Hou expressed <\/a>positive sentiments toward his preparation and gaining a better comprehension of his policy objectives.<\/p>\n Deterrence is the first \u201cD\u201d and key to understanding Hou\u2019s position. In his Foreign Affairs article, Hou commits to bolstering Taiwan\u2019s national defense.<\/p>\n “Taiwan\u2019s most important priority should be to strengthen its national defense and deter the use of force by mainland China,” Hou wrote, placing a strong emphasis on asymmetric warfare, a defense strategy encouraged by recent U.S. administrations.<\/p>\n “Taiwan must creatively use available weapons and technologies, developing innovative and asymmetric capabilities that could stymie a large and well-resourced PLA,” Hou wrote, referring to China\u2019s military, the People\u2019s Liberation Army.<\/p>\n The 3D Strategy marks a turning point for the KMT. By putting Taiwan\u2019s defense capability on top of his agenda, Hou seeks to send a strong message to China about his commitment to enhancing deterrence in preparation for potential aggression. This, coupled with a pragmatic approach to engaging with China to mitigate risks in the Taiwan Strait, greatly reflects the KMT’s evolving China policy.<\/p>\n Hou believes that enhancing Taiwan\u2019s defense capabilities can increase the potential cost of war, thus reducing Beijing\u2019s inclination to invade. In recent years, both major parties gradually have embraced the concept of asymmetric warfare due to military imbalances across the strait. They seek to challenge the PLA in the event of a Chinese invasion by employing high-end, unconventional, small, and mobile military assets at a relatively low cost.<\/p>\n Unlike Hou, KMT candidates standing for election against incumbent Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen (\u8521\u82f1\u6587 C\u00e0i Y\u012bngw\u00e9n) in 2016 and 2020 did not prioritize national defense or emphasize the connection between the constitution and the 1992 Consensus, the diplomatic basis for cross-strait exchanges between Beijing and Taipei\u2019s officials, which began in the early 1990s.<\/p>\n \u201c[The] KMT\u2019s policy toward Beijing has always been rebalanced in accordance with a precise assessment of threats posted from the other side of the Taiwan Strait,\u201d Alexander Huang (\u9ec4\u4ecb\u6b63 Hu\u00e1ng Ji\u00e8zh\u00e8ng), the KMT\u2019s representative in the United States and longtime foreign policy adviser, told The China Project. \u201cLike many countries in the world, when Beijing turns more aggressive toward Taiwan, of course, the KMT needs to be tougher than the previous period of engagement no matter if it\u2019s in power or in opposition.\u201d<\/p>\n The new strategy outlined by Hou marks a gradual but significant transformation in the views of leading KMT policymakers regarding China. Over the last few years, this shift is primarily a response to evolving domestic and international dynamics, fueled by China’s assertive conduct on the global stage and escalating pressure on Taiwan across various domains.<\/p>\n Prominent figures within the KMT who play key roles in cross-strait policy, including KMT Chairman Eric Chu, former chairman Chiang, Alexander Huang, and Hou himself, have adopted a new view of China. This shift is fueled by a growing unfavorable sentiment toward Beijing within Taiwan, marking a departure from the relatively dovish China policy observed by Ma Ying-jeou (\u99ac\u82f1\u4e5d M\u01ce Y\u012bngji\u01d4 ), the last KMT candidate to be elected president and serve, from 2008 to 2016.<\/p>\n \u201cI have no unrealistic expectations about Beijing\u2019s intention of seeking unification,\u201d Hou wrote in Foreign Affairs, a statement he underscored multiple times<\/a> throughout his U.S. trip.<\/p>\n Furthermore, Hou mentioned Taiwan\u2019s status, claiming the \u201cRepublic of China is a sovereign state,\u201d a view that sharply contrasts with Beijing\u2019s claim that Taiwan is a part of China. Hou also does not shy away from referring to China’s aggressive military behavior against Taiwan, undermining regional or even global security.<\/p>\n While differences exist, the 3D Strategy marks a general convergence of the defense policy guidelines of Hou and William Lai (\u8cf4\u6e05\u5fb7 L\u00e0i Q\u012bngd\u00e9) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party\u2019s (DPP). Both prioritize improving Taiwan’s defense capabilities, with variations on the integration of asymmetric warfare and policy detail. The KMT, for example, may opt for a balanced approach, combining both asymmetric warfare and conventional forces instead of adopting a full-asymmetric warfare.<\/p>\n Despite the attention on asymmetric warfare in both parties, Taiwan\u2019s officials are cautious about relying solely on those efforts. “The R.O.C. armed forces have built their own military based on critical demands…to counter enemies, and the guidelines of the commander-in-chief of Taiwan. Asymmetric warfare is a part of it, but not [everything],\u201d a senior Taiwan defense official told The China Project on condition of anonymity. \u201cFrom Ukraine’s counteroffensive [in its war against Russia], we learned the importance of conventional platforms, too.\u201d<\/p>\n Some observers doubt Hou\u2019s commitment to asymmetric warfare.<\/p>\n \u201cThe KMT\u2019s long-term opposition to Taiwan\u2019s procurement projects and defensive reforms contradicts Hou\u2019s statement on deterrence,\u201d said Michael Fonte, the director of the DPP\u2019s Mission in the United States, citing the example of some KMT lawmakers seeking to halt the procurement this year of the Volcano mine-dispensing systems, which, in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, could be used to slow an advance by PLA troops.<\/p>\n In addition to prioritizing Taiwan\u2019s self-defense capabilities, Hou advocated a balanced approach that blends strong defense with proactive dialogue on China as \u201ca crucial way to defuse crises and ensure peace and stability.”<\/p>\n Official communication between Taiwan and China has been suspended<\/a> since 2016 when the Tsai administration declined to accept the 1992 Consensus. Since then, Beijing has demanded adherence to the consensus as a precondition for governmental dialogue.<\/p>\n Beijing’s stance presents both of Taiwan\u2019s front-running candidates with a predicament. While Lai is open to engaging with China, he has rejected the 1992 Consensus, potentially obstructing any future dialogue if he were to be elected. Conversely, Hou\u2019s endorsement of the 1992 Consensus adversely impacts his support at home where the Consensus often is viewed unfavorably.<\/p>\n \u201cI think Beijing is concerned about the presidential transition in Taiwan, but it is willing to deal directly with any president that accepts the 1992 Consensus,\u201d Bonnie Glaser, the managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., told The China Project. \u201cThis is China’s long-standing position and shows a lack of creativity on Beijing’s part on how to improve cross-Strait relations.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cChina will have to find a new diplomatic approach if it hopes to have meaningful forward progress in dealing with the people and leadership in Taiwan,\u201d Dennis Wilder, former China director in the U.S. National Security Council, told The China Project.<\/p>\n To address the impasse across the strait, Hou presents a road map for engaging with China. He voices support for the 1992 Consensus while emphasizing the importance of Taiwan\u2019s constitution, a framing that was used by politicians before Tsai. Hou’s constitution-based approach to the 1992 Consensus and his emphasis on Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty aim to reassure domestic supporters while providing practical policy for engaging with China.<\/p>\n Hou believes that the combined strategy of bolstering national defense and fostering dialogue can effectively de-escalate risks in the Taiwan Strait.<\/p>\n \u201cContinued interactions between the two sides on functional matters will help de-escalate future risks,\u201d Hou wrote in Foreign Affairs. \u201cIn this way, Taiwan can enhance understanding through exchanges and ensure peace through strength.\u201d<\/p>\n Both major parties in Taiwan are seeking to present a policy outlook that is in line with Washington\u2019s interests, an outlook that could earn the trust of U.S. policymakers even as the Biden administration has taken a cautious, neutral approach in Taiwan\u2019s presidential election.<\/p>\n The 3D Strategy also was designed in part to align with U.S. interests. American officials have consistently called on Taiwan to strengthen its national defense while encouraging constructive dialogue across the strait, both of which are key components of Hou’s policy agenda.<\/p>\n \u201cCandidate Hou’s proposals on self-defense improvements are consistent with current U.S. policy,\u201d Wilder added. \u201cThe philosophy of combining a strong deterrent capability with cross-strait dialogue is also very much consistent with U.S. policy.\u201d<\/p>\n Hou’s U.S. trip has been successful in achieving its goals of clarifying policy, building an international profile, and fostering relationships with U.S. officials and scholars. KMT Chairman Chu praised <\/a>the visit as \u201cvery successful.\u201d<\/p>\n However, Hou’s main challenge remains at home, where he lags behind Lai in most polls. While the visit may boost his poll numbers, it remains uncertain if Hou can prevail with a voter base whose attention is also distracted by Ko and Foxconn founder Terry Gou (\u90ed\u53f0\u9298 Gu\u014d T\u00e1im\u00edng), who recently announced<\/a> his own independent election bid.<\/p>\n Prior to the visit, support for the KMT and Hou was 29% in recent presidential polls, trailing the DPP\u2019s Lai, at 36%, but ahead of candidate Ko Wen-Je (\u67ef\u6587\u54f2 K\u0113 W\u00e9nzh\u00e9) of the Taiwan People\u2019s Party (TPP), whose support was 22.9%.<\/p>\n Domestically, the perception that his U.S. visit was a success could boost Hou\u2019s standing in the polls in the coming months, much in the way Lai and Ko enjoyed a bump after their respective visits earlier this year.<\/p>\n But even with a boost in the polls, Hou will struggle to overcome Lai\u2019s lead, especially given the divisive bid for office by Ko and potentially Gou. To that end, Hou’s greatest challenge is uniting opposition candidates to turn the election tide in his favor.<\/p>\n \u201cAs election day approaches fast, candidates of KMT and TPP will soon admit that a coalition is the only way to victory unless both choose to put Taiwan\u2019s fate in the hands of a person who has a track record of die-hard independence,\u201d Huang said.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Hou Yu-ih, the Kuomintang candidate for president of the Republic of China, visited the U.S., where he signaled a tougher line on China than his party has previously taken with his 3D Strategy: The first “D” stands for \u201cdeterrence.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":20131,"featured_media":285770,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","filesize_raw":"","footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[12902],"tags":[14425,18572,16188,15195,13795,21279],"column":[],"class":[],"coauthors":[21252],"acf":[],"la_post_categories":{"politics-and-current-affairs":"Politics & Current Affairs"},"la_post_tags":{"access":"Access","dpp":"DPP","kmt":"kmt","politics":"politics","taiwan":"Taiwan","taiwan-election":"Taiwan election"},"content_writeup":{"rendered":" Here\u2019s what else you need to know about China today:<\/p>\n The U.S. added three Chinese companies to its forced labor entity list <\/strong>for \u201cthe ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other religious and ethnic minority groups,\u201d the Department of Homeland Security announced yesterday<\/a>. The action places Xinjiang Tianmian Foundation Textile, Xinjiang Tianshan Wool Textile, and Xinjiang Zhongtai Group on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List (UFLPA), bringing to total number of entities to 27 in the latest effort to purge any remnants of forced labor<\/a> from U.S. supply chains.<\/p>\n China, Japan, and South Korea plan to hold a trilateral summit \u201cin the coming months,\u201d <\/strong>after a meeting between their senior officials yesterday in Seoul, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry<\/a>. It\u2019s a signal that the three East Asian countries are renewing contact<\/a>, which has been frozen since 2019 due to the COVID pandemic and other geopolitical issues, and comes after the August trilateral meeting at the U.S. presidential retreat, Camp David<\/a>.<\/p>\n Chinese Catholics are one of the many religious groups under pressure <\/strong>from the Chinese Communist Party. A number of practitioners who tried to make a pilgrimage to Mongolia for Pope Francis\u2019s first papal visit to the country earlier in September were reportedly detained by Chinese authorities<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Chinese government has long had a contentious relationship with the Vatican: Despite an agreement in 2018<\/a> that allowed Beijing to approve all bishop appointments in China, the Communist Party has remained wary of any mass organizations over which it has no direct control. In April, Beijing unilaterally appointed a new bishop<\/a> for Shanghai, the country\u2019s biggest diocese, in an apparent violation of the pact between the two states.<\/p>\n A Chinese dissident stranded in a Taiwanese airport is pleading <\/strong>with the U.S. and Canada for asylum. Ch\u00e9n S\u012bm\u00edng \u9673\u601d\u660e has been commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre each year through street demonstrations and on social media since 2017. He told CNN<\/a> that he had fled China in July, after police asked him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation following daily calls and frequent visits to his home. He crossed through China\u2019s southern border with Laos, before traversing to Thailand and taking a flight to Taipei, where he has remained in Taoyuan International Airport since September 22.<\/p>\n \u201cI hope to receive political asylum from the U.S. or Canada. I ask friends to call on the Taiwanese government to not send me back to China,\u201d he said in a video posted to X<\/a>, adding in a caption: \u201cI am forced to be illegally stranded here.\u201d<\/p>\n Beijing is probing the relationship between former Foreign Minister Q\u00edn G\u0101ng<\/strong> \u79e6\u521a and TV presenter F\u00f9 Xi\u01ceoti\u00e1n \u5085\u6653\u7530 and a surrogate child she reportedly had in the U.S. which may be his, the Financial Times reports<\/a>, citing a variety of unnamed sources. Qin disappeared from public view on June 25 and was removed from his post a month later<\/a>, causing all kinds of speculation about the cause of his downfall<\/a>.<\/p>\n Chinese telecom giant Huawei unveiled a line of new products<\/strong> at a high-profile event<\/a> this past week. But it remained tight-lipped over the flurry of speculation that its latest smartphone contained an advanced chip breakthrough<\/a> that would put its in-house design and production capabilities on par with tech giants like the U.S.\u2019s Apple and Taiwan\u2019s TSMC.<\/p>\n Japan’s Mitsubishi Motors is ending production in China<\/strong> amid sluggish sales, and rising competition from local brands and its struggles to produce electric cars<\/a>.<\/p>\n Notable reads: <\/strong>Manoj Kewalramani, a close observer of Chinese official media and propaganda, has a new report: China’s Vision for a New World Order<\/a> on the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative, pet projects of X\u00ed J\u00ecnp\u00edng \u4e60\u8fd1\u5e73.<\/p>\n Scholar Joel Wuthnow has an essay on why Xi doesn\u2019t trust his own military<\/a>, and how corruption and other problems in the PLA might greatly reduce China\u2019s appetite for armed conflict.<\/p>\n Chinese state media: <\/strong>The People\u2019s Daily\u2019s top story today is about free trade zones<\/a>, bit the most significant piece is about Xi Jinping calling for a \u201cFengqiao Experience for the New Era<\/a>.\u201dThis, per the China Media Project<\/a>, \u201crefers to a Mao-era approach to social governance that directed people to root out \u2018reactionaries\u2019 at the grassroots.\u201d<\/p>\n Xinhua News Agency has a related story on a Politburo meeting about inspections of Party officials, Party governance and rooting out corruption<\/a>.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/thechinaproject.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/Article-Promo-1.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\nShifting views among KMT elites<\/h3>\n
Dialogue and de-escalation<\/h3>\n
Aligning to U.S. interests<\/h3>\n
The challenge remains at home<\/h3>\n